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We provide new evidence from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Decennial Census of Housing that 
the expenditure share on housing is constant over time and across U.S. metropolitan areas 
(MSA). Consistent with this observation, we consider a basic model in which identical 
households with Cobb-Douglas preferences for housing and numeraire consumption choose 
an MSA in which to live and MSAs differ with respect to income earned by residents. We 
compute constant-quality wages and rental prices for a sample of 50 U.S. MSAs. Given 
estimated wages, the calibrated model predicts that rental prices should be more dispersed 
than observed. That is, the model suggests that rental prices are too low in many high-wage 
MSAs in the year 2000. 
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A number of recent papers explore the relationship of housing prices and quantities with aggregate
consumption, aggregate investment and asset prices.1 A common assumption in this literature is
that consumption and housing are complementary in utility, but the assumed elasticity of substi-
tution between housing and consumption varies from paper to paper.2 This elasticity is critical to
the predictions of macroeconomic and asset pricing models. Among other things, it pins down the
steady-state rate of growth of aggregate house prices given the steady-state rate of growth in the
quantities of consumption and housing services.
In contrast to the volume of research studying changes to house prices and quantities in the
aggregate, there are few recent equilibrium-based studies of the market forces determining the
cross-sectional distribution of house prices across cities.3 The papers that address this topic tend
to be regression-based in nature, and presume that theory dictates that house prices in any MSA
should increase at the same rate as average income in that MSA. When incomes and prices do not
increase at the same rate, the authors assume something is amiss. Papers in this literature talk of
house price “bubbles.”4
In this paper, we contribute to the two streams of literature identiﬁed above. We document
new evidence characterizing the housing consumption behavior of U.S. households. We then build
a model consistent with this evidence and show the model sheds new light on the distribution of
housing prices across U.S. metropolitan areas.
Speciﬁcally, we begin by showing that the expenditure share on housing has been nearly constant
at the aggregate level since 1960. We then use micro data from the last three Decennial Census of
Housing (DCH) surveys to document that the housing expenditure share of renting households –
the only households for which expenditures on rent are directly observable – has been remarkably
1For papers on housing investment and/or house prices, see Davis and Heathcote (2005, 2007), Fisher (1997, 2007),
Gervais (2002), Iacoviello (2005), Gomme et. al. (2001), Greenwood et. al. (1995), Kiyotaki et al. (2007), Krueger and
Fernandez-Villaverde (2005), and Li and Yao (2006). Recent work on the role of housing in the pricing of ﬁnancial
assets includes Flavin and Nakagawa (2007), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006), Ortalo-Magn´ e and Prat (2007),
and Piazzesi et. al. (2007).
2For example, Flavin and Nakagawa (2007) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006) argue consumption and
housing are more complementary than Cobb-Douglas; Davis and Heathcote (2005) argue for Cobb-Douglas preferences
in consumption and housing; and Piazzesi et. al. (2007) argue consumption and housing are more substitutable.
3The paper that stimulated our interest in the topic is by Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2007). Van Nieuwerburgh
and Weill also use an equilibrium model to predict the cross-sectional distribution of house prices. In contrast to
our work, they assume households have quasi-linear utility of consumption and housing, and are concerned with
quantifying the impact of time-series changes to housing supply restrictions on equilibrium allocations and welfare.
4See Case and Shiller (2004) and Malpezzi (1999), for example. This literature continues to expand, even though
recently Gallin (2006) ﬁnds that local house prices and local incomes are not cointegrated.
1constant over time and across U.S. metropolitan areas. In each of the three DCH surveys (1980,
1990, and 2000), our estimate of the housing expenditure share does not vary widely across MSAs
despite signiﬁcant variation in average income. The expenditure share on housing is also remarkably
stable over time within each MSA, despite sometimes sizeable changes over time to real rental
prices. In summary, in section 2 we make the case for Cobb-Douglas preferences for consumption
and housing.
In section 3, we consider the implications of a Cobb-Douglas preference assumption for the
equilibrium distribution of house prices across MSAs. We develop a simple multi-location model
where identical households costlessly choose an MSA in which to live as well as housing in that MSA
and numeraire consumption. MSAs diﬀer with respect to income earned by residents. There is a
ﬁxed stock of perfectly divisible housing units in each MSAs. Given our estimate of the expenditure
share on housing of 24 percent, we show the diﬀerence in log rental prices of two MSAs must equal
4.2 (= 1/0.24) times the diﬀerence in log per-capita income. Equivalently, if income growth in
any MSA outpaces growth in average income (across MSAs) by 1 percentage point, rental prices
in that MSA will outpace the average growth in rental prices by 4.2 percentage points. Thus,
in a multi-city model where identical households have Cobb-Douglas preferences for housing and
consumption, rental prices in an MSA will not, in general, increase at the same rate as income in
that MSA.
The economics of this last result are straightforward. In the aggregate, the overall amount of
housing and the total population are both independent of where exactly people live. Given the
expenditure share on housing in all locations is ﬁxed, it can be shown that average rent per unit
of housing in the aggregate increases at the same rate as per-capita aggregate income. In the cross
section, in contrast, people are free to move between MSAs, and the allocation of people across
MSAs exactly determines housing per person in each city. Expanding on this thought, if households
have utility over two items, consumption and housing, and households are free to move between
MSAs, then MSAs oﬀering high levels of wages and thus consumption must simultaneously oﬀer
low levels of housing, which is accomplished by having a relatively large population. The fact that
consumption and housing are complementary in utility means that MSAs with high consumption
and low housing will necessarily have relatively high rental prices.
In the last part of our analysis, we use DCH data to compute constant-quality wages and rental
prices for the MSAs in our sample. We then calibrate our model and compare model-predicted
rental prices for each MSA to data. We show that the model predicts too much dispersion in rental
2prices. That is, the model predicts that rental prices of many high-wage MSAs should be higher
than currently observed; this result remains when we correct for variation across MSAs in the price
of consumption. Obviously, we have not presented evidence in favor or against the assumption
that certain MSAs (for example, San Francisco, CA) are desirable and thus expensive place to live
because they have high amenities and a limited supply of housing, as conjectured by Gyourko et.
al. (2006) and others. Rather, we just note that these assumptions are not necessary to explain
why San Francisco is pricey.
2 Evidence on Expenditure Shares
We begin by examining an estimate of the aggregate expenditure share on housing that can be
constructed using data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), as produced by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The estimate can be computed as the sum of expenditures on
housing services (line 14) and household operation (line 15) divided by total personal consumption
expenditures (line 1), data from NIPA table 2.3.5. Expenditures on housing services include both
measured rental payments by tenants and an imputation of the rental value of owned homes, and
expenditures on household operation include expenditures on electricity, gas, water, telephone.5
The expenditure share on housing resulting from this calculation for the 1929-2006 period, the
entire period for which annual data are available, is shown in ﬁgure 1. The mean of the expenditure
share over this period is 20.1 percent with a standard deviation of 2.0 percent. If only the past 46
years experience is considered (1960-2006), the mean of the expenditure share is 21.0 percent and
the standard deviation is only 0.6 percent. Given the stable mean and low standard deviation, a
reasonable characterization of NIPA data is that the expenditure share on housing is constant. For
this reason, recent macroeconomic models studying housing specify Cobb-Douglas preferences for
consumption and housing: Examples include Davis and Heathcote (2005), Iacoviello (2005), and
Kiyotaki et al. (2007).
For the purposes of establishing the constancy of the expenditure share on housing as a stylized
fact, the NIPA-based estimate is potentially problematic because expenditures on space rent by
homeowners are imputed. For example, in 2004 the imputed amount for space rent for owner-
occupied dwellings accounted for 54 percent of the sum of expenditures on housing services and
5There are some other miscellaneous components of spending on housing services and household operation. In
2005, these other components accounted for about 8.5 percent of the total.
3household operation in the NIPA.6 The reason that space rent for owned homes is imputed is that
house prices for owner-occupied housing are observed, but market-based rental expenditures on
these houses are not.
Verbrugge (2006) and others have argued that expenditures on housing services by homeowners
can be imputed as the product of a current mortgage rate and (self-reported) house value. This
estimate may not reﬂect the current rental price of the house because house prices are capitalized
rents, and cap-rates vary across locations if either future expected rental growth or the location-
speciﬁc risk component of housing assets varies across MSAs. Recent theory (Ortalo-Magn´ e and
Prat 2007) and evidence (Campbell et. al. 2007) suggests that the risk-premia for owner-occupied
housing could signiﬁcantly vary across MSAs.
To circumvent the problem that homeowner expenditures on housing services are essentially
unobservable, we study the expenditures on housing services by renting households. We construct
an estimate of the expenditure share on housing by renting households using micro data from the
Decennial Census of Housing (DCH) ﬁles.7 The ﬁrst three columns of Table 1 list the median of the
ratio of annual gross rent to total household wage and salary income that we derive from the DCH
for the top 50 MSAs by population in 2000, for renter households with nonzero wage and salary
income and nonzero rental payments, for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000. These MSAs account for
about 46 percent of the population in 1980-2000. The total proportion of the population living in
this set of MSAs has remained about ﬁxed, although population has shifted among MSAs. Gross
rental payments are inclusive of expenditures on utilities, and thus the estimates in Table 1 are
likely comparable to the NIPA-based estimate.
The data in Table 1 show that, measured at the median, the estimated expenditure share on
housing is remarkably stable across MSAs and over time.8 In any given year, the expenditure
share, measured at the median, is nearly constant across MSAs at about 0.24 with a standard
6We do not believe that the BEA is imputing the rental value of owned-homes in such a way as to ensure the
constancy of this expenditure share. Available documentation (Personal Consumption Expenditures, 1990, p. 61)
suggests that since 1984, the BEA has computed owner-occupied rent as the price index for owner-equivalent rent
from the CPI, times a quality adjustment to account for improvements to the owner-occupied stock of housing, times
an estimate of the aggregate number of owned housing units.
7These data are available at the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) web site,
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/. We exclude farm households, households living in group quarters, and households living
in mobile homes, trailers, boats, tents, vans, or “other” from the DCH data.
8An estimate of the expenditure share on housing for non-homeowners in the aggregate U.S. can also be computed
using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). From 1980-2005, the CEX-generated estimate has trended up from
0.20 to 0.25. Although the average of this share is in-line with the estimates in Table 1, the fact that the CEX
estimate has a trend is at odds with our DCH-based evidence that the expenditure share is stable.
4deviation of about 0.02 (shown in the bottom two rows). The fact that expenditure shares remain
constant over time in each MSA, and constant across MSAs in each year, is not due to lack of
cross-sectional variation of income or time-series variation in real rental prices. The fourth column
of Table 1 reports, by MSA, the average household wage and salary income in 2000 for renter
households with an expenditure share on housing within 1 percentage point of the MSA-median.
The standard deviation of this measure, $5,867, is 17 percent of the MSA-average, $35,425. The
right-most column of Table 1 reports growth of real rental prices in each MSA from 1980-2000.9 The
reported expenditure share in each MSA is nearly constant in every MSA, despite the sometimes
large increases in the real relative price of rental units shown in this column.
Although the distribution of expenditure shares of renting households is roughly constant in all
MSAs in any given year and across time for any MSA – the average across MSAs of the 25th and
75 percentiles of the expenditure shares are 17 and 36 percent, respectively, and these percentiles
are stable across MSAs and over time (not shown)10 – one caveat to our ﬁndings is that within
each MSA, the expenditure share on rent is decreasing with household income in that MSA. One
possibility is that expenditures truly fall with income, and that our ﬁnding that the median of the
expenditure share is nearly constant across time and places is coincidence. We do not share this
view, and in the remainder of this section we argue that the negative correlation of income and
expenditure shares within MSAs is not necessarily at odds with a constant expenditure share on
housing. The reason is that we do not compute an exact measure of expenditure shares, because we
divide rental expenditures by wage and salary income and not by consumption, which is unobserved.
The gap between consumption and income is key to explaining why expenditure shares fall with
income.
To see this, suppose that consumption is equal to permanent income, and that observed income
for person i is equal to permanent income for that person, ¯ wi, times a deviation of income from
permanent income, ei, such that
wi = ¯ wi ei. (1)
For simplicity, assume that the natural log of ei is Normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2. By assumption, the median of ei is therefore 1.
9Growth in real rental prices is computed as growth in nominal rental price per unit less consumer price inﬂation
excluding housing services and household operation. Nominal rent per unit is computed in 1980 and 2000 using
DCH data and a hedonic regression approach described later in the paper. Consumer prices less housing services and
household operation increased by 84 percent from 1980-2000 according to data from the NIPA.
10The standard deviation across MSAs of the expenditure share at the 25th and 75th percentiles is almost exactly
1.6 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively, in each of 1980, 1990, and 2000.





where ri is the rental expenditure of person i. The observed expenditure share is a random variable

















When ei > 1, implying income is higher than permanent income, the observed expenditure share
will be less than α and vice-versa. An unbiased estimate of α is the median of equation (3), since the
median value of ei is 1. The fact that ei is assumed to be lognormally distributed is not important;
the fact that the median of ei is equal to 1, however, is critical.
With the assumptions we have made, the distribution of observed expenditure shares is indepen-
dent of the distribution of permanent income, and only depends on the distribution of the deviation
of income from permanent income. If the distribution of the deviations of income from permanent
income is similar across MSAs, then the distribution of our estimated expenditure shares will also
be similar across MSAs. This may be the reason why the inter-quartile range of the expenditure
share is stable across MSAs and over time.
An easy way to show that the distribution of expenditure shares is independent of the distribu-
tion of permanent income given the assumptions we have made, is to assume that there are only
two levels of permanent income in the sample, ¯ wi,1 and ¯ wi,2, and that the probability a person has
permanent income equal to ¯ wi,1 is p. If the distribution of deviations is independent of the level of




























Thus, the fact that income is not equal to permanent income is suﬃcient to cause measured
expenditure shares to fall with observed income, as they do in the data. In fact, given our assump-
tions it can be shown that the correlation of the inverse of the expenditure share (wi/xi) with
observed income wi should equal 1. In our data, the correlation of the inverse of the expenditure
share with observed income varies by MSA, but the average is about 0.7.
6Finally, if deviations of (wi/xi) from average are truly reﬂective of diﬀerences in current income
from permanent income, then we should expect to see ei vary in a particular way with age. Assuming
that income over the life-cycle is hump-shaped, with a peak somewhere around age 55, we should
expect to ﬁnd that ei increases with age until peak earnings years, somewhere around age 55, and
then declines after that. To test this, we compute deviations of log(wi/xi) from its average – these
deviations are exactly equal to log(ei) – and then regress the deviations on age of the primary wage
earner of the household, with age lumped into 5 year bins (except for the bins corresponding to
the youngest and oldest ages). The coeﬃcients from these regressions for all three DCH years are
shown in Figure 2. The coeﬃcients on each age bin are broadly comparable across years, and the
coeﬃcients behave exactly as expected, rising until about age 55 and then declining.11
3 Model with Constant Expenditure Shares
3.1 Environment
We consider an economy with N MSAs indexed by i = 1,...,N. The economy is populated by a
measure µ of identical agents. The decision problem of agents in this economy is static and thus we
suppress time subscripts. Any agent who lives in MSA i produces wi units of food, the numeraire
consumption good. There are Hi units of divisible housing in MSA i owned by a measure zero of
agents who behave competitively in the rental housing market.
Agents choose in which MSA to live, how much food to consume and how much housing to
rent. Given a set of housing rental prices for each MSA, {ri}i=1,N, agents choose the MSA i, food




subject to c + ri h ≤ wi, (6)
with 0 < α < 1. All agents who choose the same MSA i choose the same numeraire and housing
levels ci = (1 − α) wi and hi = α wi/ri.
An allocation is fully characterized by the set of food consumption and housing chosen by
agents in each MSA , {ci,hi}i=1,N and the measures of agents living in each MSA, {ni}i=1,N. An
equilibrium in this economy is a set of rental prices {ri}i=1,N, and an allocation such that: (1)
Agents maximize their utility taking the rental prices as given; (2) In every MSA that is occupied,
11This evidence is in line with the ﬁndings of Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005).
7the housing market clears; i.e., ni hi = Hi if ni > 0.; (3) No household wants to move; i.e., all
agents derive the same utility whatever MSA they choose.
We restrict our attention to sets of parameters such that all MSAs are occupied in equilibrium.






Hi/hi = µ. (7)
The condition that agents are indiﬀerent between living in MSAs i and j means:
[(1 − α)wi]
1−α [hi]
α = [(1 − α)wj]
1−α [hj]
α (8)
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3.2 Predictions
The model predicts that the optimal expenditure share on housing is constant at α in every MSA.
If we were to include time subscripts, and specify the economy as a sequence of static problems,
then the predicted expenditure share on housing would also be constant over time. This result
directly follows from our assumption of a Cobb-Douglas utility assumption.
8The more interesting prediction of the model is that the ratio of rental prices between any two











Equation (13) implies that rental prices in MSA i will not increase at the same rate as income in
MSA i if income increases relative to that of MSA j. Speciﬁcally, if income in MSA i increases by
one percentage point more than income in MSA j, then rental prices in MSA i will outpace rental
prices in j by 1/α percent. If α = 0.24, as we assume in the next section, then each percentage
point diﬀerential in wage growth translates to a 4.2 percentage point diﬀerential in rental growth.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Suppose that i and j are identical in every
respect. Now suppose that city i is hit with a positive income shock but income in city j remains
constant. In equilibrium, the following condition must hold to ensure that agents are indiﬀerent to






The ﬁrst-order conditions specify that ci and rihi both increase with wi. For equation (14) to hold,
if ci increases, hi must simultaneously decrease. Thus, hi is decreasing at the same time that rihi
is increasing.
Equation (13) also implies that the supply of housing in MSA i or j does not aﬀect relative
rental prices in either i or j. Thus, according to the model, San Francisco, CA is not expensive
relative to, say, Tucson, AZ, because of supply restrictions enacted in San Francisco. Supply does
not aﬀect relative prices because households are free to move across MSAs. A particular MSA’s
own housing supply aﬀects directly the number of agents who live in this MSA. Mathematically, Hi








, just as the supply of any other MSA.
A direct implication of this formula is that changes in the supply of housing in any MSA aﬀects
price levels everywhere, but does not aﬀect the relative price of housing of any two MSAs.
Equations (11) and (12) can be combined to show that at the aggregate level, the model produces
a constant ratio of rental expenditures to income,
 
i riHi  
i niwi
= α . (15)
The model also predicts that the ratio of average rental price per unit to aggregate per-capita
income is independent of the dispersion of income across MSAs. Rather, the ratio of average rental
9price per unit to aggregate per-capita income is equal to the expenditure share on housing divided
by the average quantity of housing consumed per-household:
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Thus, while the model predicts that rental prices disproportionately reﬂect income diﬀerentials in
the cross-section of MSAs at any given time, it also predicts that prices and per-capita incomes
increase at the same rate over time in the aggregate, assuming per-capita housing in the aggregate
is ﬁxed.
4 Model Fit
After taking logs of equation (13), and recognizing that equation (13) holds for any j, the following


















Given this, we deﬁne ¯ r and ¯ w such that ¯ r = exp{ 1
N
 N




and construct a predicted rental value in each MSA,   ri, as







We test the model by setting α = 0.24 and comparing the predicted value to the observed value ri
for the year 2000.12
In order to operationalize equation (18), we need to compute a standardized measure of income,
wi, appropriate for each MSA. To do this, we turn to micro data from the 2000 DCH. On an MSA-
by-MSA basis, we regress the log of reported wage and salary income for any person that worked
at least 40 weeks in the previous year on a constant and a set of human capital variables. These
variables include gender, age variables in 5-year bins, and categorical variables for educational
attainment (nothing or missing, less than high school degree, high school degree, some college,
college degree or more). These log wage regressions capture about 30 percent of the variation in
log wages within each MSA.13
12Qualitatively, the results for 1980 and 1990 are identical to those that we document for 2000.
13For our rent and wage regressions, coeﬃcients and R
2 values for each MSA are available on request.
10By regressing wages on age and education variables, we control for the variation in within-
MSA wages that is attributable to diﬀerences in human capital. We use wage and salary income,
rather than a broader measure that includes transfer or capital income, to focus on income-earning
potential that is location speciﬁc. We consider only income of persons working 40 weeks or more
the previous year to abstract from diﬀerences in average wages across MSAs that are attributable
to diﬀerences in the number of part-time workers.
To compute a standardized wage that holds age and human capital constant across locations,
we multiply the estimated regression coeﬃcients in each MSA by the the fraction of workers for the
entire U.S. that are appropriate for each dummy variable in the regression. Once we have computed
this standardized wage for a representative full-time worker in each MSA, we multiply by 1.53 to
compute average household income in that MSA; this is the average number of full time workers
in each household, for all households that include at least one full time worker.
Our procedure to estimate constant quality rental prices ri consistently across MSAs is con-
ceptually similar. On an MSA-by-MSA basis, we regress the level of gross rents paid by renting
households on available characteristics of the housing unit and the method and time of commute
(home to work) of the highest income earner in the household. For housing-unit characteristics, we
include categorical variables describing the number of rooms, the number of bedrooms, the year the
unit was built, and the total number of units in the building in which the unit is located, and from
these categorical variables, we generate a full set of dummy variables. For the method of commute
of the household’s highest income earner, we subdivide responses into three dummy variables corre-
sponding to the use of private automobiles, public transportation, or walking/biking. For commute
time of the highest income earner, we use the recorded response.14 These rent regressions capture
about 25 percent of the variation in reported rental expenditures within each MSA.
Using the regression coeﬃcients for each MSA, we predict the level of rent, by MSA, for a four-
room, two-bedroom unit located in a 5-9 family building, where the primary wage earner commutes
15 minutes by private auto. The building itself is assumed to have been built between 1960 and
1969. These are the median readings of these variables for our sample of renting households in the
U.S.
Our estimates of standardized wages and rental prices, wi and ri, for the year 2000 are listed
in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 2, which is sorted in descending order by standardized wages.
Rental prices are high in high-wage places: The correlation of rental prices and wages is 0.81. The
14We create a separate dummy variable for households with a recorded commute of zero minutes.
11third and fourth columns of the table show predicted rental prices based on equation (18),   ri, and
the diﬀerence of the observed and predicted rental rate, denoted ei. These two columns show that
the model predicts too much dispersion in rental prices given the observed wage dispersion. The
correlation of ei and wi is -0.92. Rental prices are not high enough in high-wage places and rental
prices are too high in low wage places.
We perform two sensitivity analysis to ensure that this ﬁnding of a negative correlation is a
robust feature of data. First, we eliminate home-owners from our regressions and computations
of MSA-average wages, so that MSA-speciﬁc calculations of ri and wi are from exactly the same
samples of renting households. Second, and separately, we include only households where (a) the
primary respondent of the household has moved to a diﬀerent metropolitan area within the past
5 years and (b) the previous metropolitan area of residence is directly identiﬁable. Although our
estimates of wi change in the ﬁrst analysis, and wi and ri both change in the second analysis, in
both analyses we ﬁnd that the correlation of ei and wi is approximately -0.9.
One question that arises is whether a small change in α more closely aligns predicted rental
rates with observed rental rates. It is possible to show that potentially reasonable changes to α are
not suﬃcient to drive the correlation of ei and wi to zero. For example, at α = 0.35, the correlation
of ei and wi is -0.65. When α = 0.52, the correlation falls to zero.
Thus, our ﬁnding that wi and ei are negatively correlated seems quite robust, since in economic
terms, expenditure shares of ﬁfty percent are far from the 24 percent we estimate. However, it
has recently been argued (Albouy 2007) that some fraction of consumption is produced locally.
If the prices of locally-produced consumption goods are correlated with wages, then wages after
accounting for variation in consumption prices are likely less dispersed than nominal wages. If
wages are less dispersed, predicted rental prices will also be less dispersed holding α constant.
Data on local consumption prices in 2000 by MSA is available from the 2000 ACCRA (American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association) Cost of Living Index, as published by the Council
for Community and Economic Research. ACCRA participants collect price-level data on 59 non-
housing items, grouped broadly into 5 non-housing categories – Grocery (26 questions), Utilities
(6), Transportation (2), Health care (5), and Miscellaneous (20). The questions range from the
price of a box of Corn Flakes (Grocery) to the average price per game of bowling on Saturday
evening between 6 and 10 pm (Miscellaneous).15 For each of these 5 categories, ACCRA constructs
a local price level based on the sample of prices of the individual items, and sets the average price
15The complete list of questions is available at http://www.coli.org/SurveyForms/PricingSurveyForm.pdf.
12level across sampled MSAs for each of the 6 categories to 100. ACCRA also reports expenditure
shares for each of the categories in 2000: Grocery (0.16), Utilities (0.08), Transportation (0.10),
Health Care (0.05), and Miscellaneous (0.33).
To explicitly incorporate local prices in our model, and in a manner that is consistent with the
construction of the ACCRA data, we assume that households have Cobb-Douglas preferences over
a bundle of S consumption goods and housing. That is, utility in city i is assumed to be of the








and households are subject to the budget constraint
S  
s=1
pi,s ci,s + rihi ≤ wi , (20)
where we assume that
 S
s=1 βs + α = 1. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, households optimally
choose constant expenditure shares on the bundle of all consumption items and housing, pi,sci,s =
βswi and rihi = αwi.
Given the assumptions, in equilibrium the following relationship holds between rental prices,





















After adjusting nominal wages for consumption prices, as in equation (22), we predict rental prices






i,s for 48 of our 50 MSAs, the exceptions being Buﬀalo, NY and Bakersﬁeld,
CA.16 We match the ACCRA metropolitan division codes to the relevant MSAs, but for about 10
of the larger MSAs, the ACCRA survey only covers a subset of metropolitan divisions within the
MSA. We suspect this distinction is probably not of quantitative importance, except perhaps for
the New York, NY MSA, in which we ﬁnd the level of consumption prices is about 13 percent higher
than the next-most pricey MSA, San Francisco, CA.17 We assume households consume a basket of
16ACCRA also does not provide consumption price data for San Jose, CA, but in this case we set the consumption
prices equal to those in San Francisco, CA.
17In the New York MSA, the only included metropolitan division (of four in total) is the “New York-White Plains-
Wayne” division.
13S = 5 consumption items – groceries, utilities, transportation, health care, and miscellaneous – and
proportionately rescale each of the 5 ACCRA expenditure shares so that the sum
 5
s=1 βs = 0.76,
which yields a 24 percent expenditure share on housing.






i,s (after a simple rescaling such that the average of pi across MSAs is equal to
1.0), wages after adjusting for prices as in equation (22),   wi, actual rental prices, ri, and predicted
rental prices after wages have been adjusted for consumption prices,   ri. Like Table 2, Table 3 is
sorted in descending order of nominal wages. The correlation of nominal wages and consumption
price levels (pi) is high, 0.54. Even so, Table 3 shows that, on average, rental prices are still too
low in places that oﬀer relatively high wages after accounting for consumption prices: At α = 0.24,
the correlation of the gap between actual and predicted rental prices, ei, and adjusted income,   wi,
shown in Table 3 is -0.74. Further, the value of α required to set this correlation to zero is 0.76.
A ﬁnal and related point is that we are aware we can more accurately predict rental prices given
the distribution of wages if we are willing to redeﬁne household utility. Ignoring variation in local
consumption prices, suppose utility in city i is deﬁned as zic1−α
i hα











Whatever zi is, assuming α = 0.24, it must be negatively correlated with wages. It could perhaps
be a “quality of life” variable, as in Kahn (1995) or Rappaport (2006), or perhaps could be related
to congestion externalities linked to density. Rather than tell a story about zi, we note the follow-
ing: Without zi, a simple model of location choice that reproduces the observation that housing
expenditure shares are constant across locations predicts that rental prices of the highest-wage
MSAs are higher that currently observed.
5 Conclusions
We use aggregate data from the NIPA and micro data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 DCH to
document that the expenditure share on housing is remarkably constant across MSAs and over
time. We engineer a simple model consistent with this observation and explore its predictions. The
model predicts more dispersion in rental prices than is observed in the data. In other words, the
model suggests that rental prices aren’t high enough for high-wage MSAs and aren’t low enough
14for low wage MSAs. This result holds true even once we adjust local wages for variation in the
price of consumption goods.
A key distinguishing feature of our general spatial equilibrium model, relative to many papers
in the urban economics literature, is our use of Cobb-Douglas preferences. This assumption yields
a constant housing expenditure share in equilibrium, consistent with the evidence we uncover. The
same assumption has been used to study the internal structure of cities (Lucas 2001 and Lucas
and Rossi-Hansberg 2002) and to explain the distribution of population across MSAs (Eeckhout
2004). At the aggregate level, the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences is consistent with the
popular view that the ratio of the average price of houses to income should be constant. This paper
demonstrates that this insight from aggregate models is misleading when applied to MSA-level data.
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17Figure 2: 1980, 1990, 2000 DCH: Coeﬃcients of Regression Output of Age on the Deviations of
Log Inverse of Expenditure Share
18Table 1
Median Ratio of Rental Expenditures to Wage and Salary Income (1980, 1990, and 2000),
Average Income around Median Ratio (2000), Growth in Real Rental Prices (1980-2000)
Median Ratio HH Inc. at Median Real Rent Growth,
MSA 1980 1990 2000 Rent-Income (2000) 1980-2000
Albany-Schenectady-Troy 0.21 0.23 0.23 $32,035 15.9%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta 0.24 0.25 0.25 $37,304 24.6%
Austin-Round Rock 0.27 0.25 0.25 $35,948 42.2%
Bakersﬁeld 0.28 0.25 0.25 $29,860 2.7%
Baltimore-Towson 0.23 0.23 0.23 $35,076 34.8%
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy 0.24 0.26 0.24 $43,284 53.4%
Buﬀalo-Niagara Falls 0.20 0.22 0.23 $32,368 21.2%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord 0.23 0.24 0.24 $39,772 27.5%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet 0.21 0.23 0.23 $38,677 33.5%
Cincinnati-Middletown 0.21 0.22 0.20 $35,685 5.6%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor 0.21 0.22 0.23 $34,058 4.8%
Columbus 0.22 0.23 0.23 $31,981 37.8%
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington 0.24 0.24 0.24 $36,540 32.7%
Denver-Aurora 0.25 0.24 0.26 $36,804 19.2%
Detroit-Warren-Livonia 0.21 0.22 0.22 $36,719 6.9%
Fresno 0.25 0.27 0.26 $28,924 13.3%
Grand Rapids-Wyoming 0.19 0.24 0.21 $28,742 16.8%
Greensboro-High Point 0.24 0.23 0.22 $32,231 23.8%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown 0.23 0.22 0.23 $35,205 7.4%
Indianapolis-Carmel 0.21 0.23 0.23 $33,158 8.4%
Jacksonville 0.27 0.24 0.25 $31,737 4.2%
Kansas City 0.21 0.22 0.22 $36,521 21.7%
Las Vegas-Paradise 0.29 0.27 0.27 $34,275 19.6%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana 0.25 0.29 0.27 $38,494 36.9%
Louisville-Jeﬀerson County 0.22 0.23 0.21 $33,518 4.6%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach 0.27 0.29 0.29 $29,604 24.7%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis 0.20 0.23 0.22 $33,662 12.5%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington 0.24 0.25 0.23 $37,011 19.1%
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin 0.23 0.24 0.24 $31,590 23.8%
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner 0.24 0.25 0.24 $28,713 24.4%
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island 0.22 0.24 0.24 $45,805 38.6%
Orlando-Kissimmee 0.26 0.27 0.27 $33,704 40.9%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington 0.22 0.24 0.23 $38,491 32.9%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale 0.28 0.26 0.26 $34,026 9.1%
Pittsburgh 0.21 0.21 0.22 $31,872 10.5%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton 0.27 0.24 0.25 $33,893 19.3%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario 0.26 0.28 0.27 $35,622 17.8%
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville 0.25 0.28 0.26 $35,352 39.0%
St. Louis 0.22 0.23 0.22 $33,966 4.2%
Salt Lake City 0.24 0.23 0.27 $32,980 23.2%
San Antonio 0.22 0.24 0.24 $30,686 14.1%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos 0.29 0.30 0.28 $36,050 38.5%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont 0.26 0.28 0.25 $52,422 70.8%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara 0.24 0.26 0.25 $58,680 110.4%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue 0.25 0.25 0.26 $39,303 33.8%
Syracuse 0.24 0.24 0.24 $28,248 16.6%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 0.26 0.25 0.25 $32,972 22.9%
Tucson 0.26 0.29 0.26 $30,111 -2.6%
Tulsa 0.23 0.22 0.23 $29,600 1.2%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria 0.23 0.26 0.24 $47,994 46.4%
Average 0.24 0.25 0.24 $35,425 24.2%
Standard Deviation 0.02 0.02 0.02 $5,867 19.5%
19Table 2
Wages (wi), observed rents (ri), predicted rents (ˆ ri), and error (ei = ri − ˆ ri), 2000
MSA wi ri ˆ ri ei
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara $73,095 $1,266 $2,005 -$739
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont $65,618 $1,030 $1,279 -$249
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island $65,272 $797 $1,251 -$454
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria $63,868 $825 $1,143 -$318
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy $62,209 $887 $1,024 -$137
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet $61,805 $727 $997 -$269
Detroit-Warren-Livonia $61,750 $680 $993 -$313
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington $59,862 $748 $873 -$125
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington $59,476 $612 $849 -$237
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana $58,933 $867 $818 $50
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta $58,703 $655 $804 -$149
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown $58,678 $606 $803 -$197
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue $58,612 $785 $799 -$14
Baltimore-Towson $58,351 $694 $784 -$90
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord $57,836 $625 $756 -$131
Denver-Aurora $57,676 $633 $747 -$115
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington $57,272 $655 $726 -$71
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville $56,525 $613 $687 -$74
Austin-Round Rock $56,389 $672 $680 -$9
Cincinnati-Middletown $55,831 $519 $653 -$134
Las Vegas-Paradise $55,831 $636 $653 -$17
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale $55,813 $622 $652 -$30
Indianapolis-Carmel $55,437 $562 $634 -$72
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos $55,296 $754 $627 $127
Kansas City $55,152 $633 $620 $12
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor $55,128 $544 $619 -$75
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario $55,034 $593 $615 -$22
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton $54,878 $617 $607 $10
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis $54,463 $625 $589 $37
Louisville-Jeﬀerson County $53,942 $447 $565 -$118
Columbus $53,773 $602 $558 $44
St. Louis $53,678 $548 $554 -$5
Grand Rapids-Wyoming $53,477 $504 $545 -$42
Jacksonville $53,000 $561 $525 $36
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin $52,972 $538 $524 $14
Greensboro-High Point $52,696 $509 $513 -$4
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater $52,505 $622 $505 $117
Bakersﬁeld $52,436 $459 $502 -$43
Salt Lake City $52,086 $584 $489 $96
Albany-Schenectady-Troy $51,569 $642 $469 $174
Tulsa $51,329 $502 $460 $42
Orlando-Kissimmee $50,795 $634 $440 $194
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach $50,172 $722 $418 $304
Syracuse $49,600 $557 $399 $158
San Antonio $49,505 $560 $395 $165
Fresno $48,902 $509 $376 $134
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner $48,863 $569 $374 $194
Buﬀalo-Niagara Falls $48,657 $593 $368 $225
Pittsburgh $48,496 $538 $363 $175
Tucson $46,576 $512 $307 $206
Average $55,596 $644 $679 -$35
Standard Deviation $5,118 $145 $296 $187
20Table 3




i,s), adjusted wages ( ˜ wi),
observed rents (ri), predicted rents based on adjusted wages (˜ ri), and error (ei = ri − ˜ ri), 2000
MSA wi pi ˜ wi ri ˜ ri ei
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara $73,095 1.13 $64,650 $1,266 $1,184 $82
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont $65,618 1.13 $58,037 $1,030 $755 $275
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island $65,272 1.26 $51,954 $797 $476 $321
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria $63,868 1.04 $61,679 $825 $973 -$148
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy $62,209 1.08 $57,514 $887 $727 $160
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet $61,805 1.02 $60,576 $727 $903 -$175
Detroit-Warren-Livonia $61,750 0.99 $62,625 $680 $1,037 -$357
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington $59,862 1.04 $57,481 $748 $726 $22
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington $59,476 0.98 $60,838 $612 $919 -$307
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana $58,933 1.03 $57,166 $867 $709 $158
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta $58,703 0.97 $60,640 $655 $907 -$252
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown $58,678 0.94 $62,416 $606 $1,023 -$417
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue $58,612 0.98 $59,509 $785 $838 -$53
Baltimore-Towson $58,351 0.95 $61,279 $694 $947 -$253
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord $57,836 0.97 $59,900 $625 $862 -$237
Denver-Aurora $57,676 0.98 $58,642 $633 $789 -$156
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington $57,272 1.02 $55,919 $655 $647 $8
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville $56,525 1.06 $53,115 $613 $522 $91
Austin-Round Rock $56,389 0.92 $61,390 $672 $954 -$283
Cincinnati-Middletown $55,831 0.96 $58,197 $519 $764 -$245
Las Vegas-Paradise $55,831 1.01 $55,195 $636 $613 $23
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale $55,813 0.98 $57,125 $622 $707 -$85
Indianapolis-Carmel $55,437 0.95 $58,430 $562 $777 -$215
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos $55,296 1.06 $52,061 $754 $480 $273
Kansas City $55,152 0.99 $55,686 $633 $636 -$3
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor $55,128 1.03 $53,721 $544 $547 -$3
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario $55,034 1.07 $51,660 $593 $465 $128
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton $54,878 0.99 $55,247 $617 $615 $2
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis $54,463 0.96 $56,938 $625 $697 -$72
Louisville-Jeﬀerson County $53,942 0.96 $56,197 $447 $660 -$213
Columbus $53,773 0.96 $55,801 $602 $641 -$39
St. Louis $53,678 0.96 $55,669 $548 $635 -$86
Grand Rapids-Wyoming $53,477 1.00 $53,334 $504 $531 -$27
Jacksonville $53,000 0.95 $55,692 $561 $636 -$75
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin $52,972 0.93 $57,099 $538 $706 -$168
Greensboro-High Point $52,696 0.94 $55,998 $509 $651 -$142
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater $52,505 0.97 $54,109 $622 $564 $58
Bakersﬁeld $52,436
Salt Lake City $52,086 0.98 $53,279 $584 $529 $55
Albany-Schenectady-Troy $51,569 1.00 $51,524 $642 $460 $182
Tulsa $51,329 0.94 $54,800 $502 $595 -$93
Orlando-Kissimmee $50,795 0.97 $52,288 $634 $489 $145
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach $50,172 1.03 $48,939 $722 $371 $351
Syracuse $49,600 1.01 $48,940 $557 $371 $186
San Antonio $49,505 0.91 $54,521 $560 $582 -$22
Fresno $48,902 1.04 $47,086 $509 $316 $193
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner $48,863 0.99 $49,518 $569 $390 $179
Buﬀalo-Niagara Falls $48,657
Pittsburgh $48,496 1.01 $47,874 $538 $339 $200
Tucson $46,576 0.96 $48,304 $512 $351 $161
Average $55,596 1.00 $55,845 $649 $667 -$18
Standard Deviation $5,118 0.06 $4,228 $146 $204 $187
21CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2092 Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Claus Thustrup Kreiner and Emmanuel Saez, The Optimal 
Income Taxation of Couples as a Multi-Dimensional Screening Problem, September 
2007 
 
2093 Michael Rauber and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Life Cycle and Cohort Productivity in 
Economic Research: The Case of Germany, September 2007 
 
2094 David B. Audretsch, Oliver Falck and Stephan Heblich, It’s All in Marshall: The Impact 
of External Economies on Regional Dynamics, September 2007 
 
2095 Michael Binder and Christian J. Offermanns, International Investment Positions and 
Exchange Rate Dynamics: A Dynamic Panel Analysis, September 2007 
 
2096 Louis N. Christofides and Amy Chen Peng, Real Wage Chronologies, September 2007 
 
2097 Martin Kolmar and Andreas Wagener, Tax Competition with Formula Apportionment: 
The Interaction between Tax Base and Sharing Mechanism, September 2007 
 
2098 Daniela Treutlein, What actually Happens to EU Directives in the Member States? – A 
Cross-Country Cross-Sector View on National Transposition Instruments, September 
2007 
 
2099 Emmanuel C. Mamatzakis, An Analysis of the Impact of Public Infrastructure on 
Productivity Performance of Mexican Industry, September 2007 
 
2100 Gunther Schnabl and Andreas Hoffmann, Monetary Policy, Vagabonding Liquidity and 
Bursting Bubbles in New and Emerging Markets – An Overinvestment View, 
September 2007 
 
2101 Panu Poutvaara, The Expansion of Higher Education and Time-Consistent Taxation, 
September 2007 
 
2102 Marko Koethenbuerger and Ben Lockwood, Does Tax Competition Really Promote 
Growth?, September 2007 
 
2103 M. Hashem Pesaran and Elisa Tosetti, Large Panels with Common Factors and Spatial 
Correlations, September 2007 
 
2104 Laszlo Goerke and Marco Runkel, Tax Evasion and Competition, September 2007 
 
2105 Scott Alan Carson, Slave Prices, Geography and Insolation in 19
th Century African-
American Stature, September 2007 
 
2106 Wolfram F. Richter, Efficient Tax Policy Ranks Education Higher than Saving, October 
2007  
2107 Jarko Fidrmuc and Roman Horváth, Volatility of Exchange Rates in Selected New EU 
Members: Evidence from Daily Data, October 2007 
 
2108 Torben M. Andersen and Michael Svarer, Flexicurity – Labour Market Performance in 
Denmark, October 2007 
 
2109 Jonathan P. Thomas and Tim Worrall, Limited Commitment Models of the Labor 
Market, October 2007 
 
2110 Carlos Pestana Barros, Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Identification 
of Segments of European Banks with a Latent Class Frontier Model, October 2007 
 
2111 Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D., Sebastian Vollmer and Immaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, 
Competitiveness – A Comparison of China and Mexico, October 2007 
 
2112 Mark Mink, Jan P.A.M. Jacobs and Jakob de Haan, Measuring Synchronicity and Co-
movement of Business Cycles with an Application to the Euro Area, October 2007 
 
2113 Ossip Hühnerbein and Tobias Seidel, Intra-regional Tax Competition and Economic 
Geography, October 2007 
 
2114 Christian Keuschnigg, Exports, Foreign Direct Investment and the Costs of Corporate 
Taxation, October 2007 
 
2115 Werner Bönte, Oliver Falck and Stephan Heblich, Demography and Innovative 
Entrepreneurship, October 2007 
 
2116 Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and M. Hashem Pesaran, Assessing Forecast Uncertainties 
in a VECX Model for Switzerland: An Exercise in Forecast Combination across Models 
and Observation Windows, October 2007 
 
2117 Ben Lockwood, Voting, Lobbying, and the Decentralization Theorem, October 2007 
 
2118 Andrea Ichino, Guido Schwerdt, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Josef Zweimüller, Too Old 
to Work, too Young to Retire?, October 2007 
 
2119 Wolfgang Eggert, Tim Krieger and Volker Meier, Education, Unemployment and 
Migration, October 2007 
 
2120 Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, The European Commission – Appointment, 
Preferences, and Institutional Relations, October 2007 
 
2121 Bertil Holmlund and Martin Söderström, Estimating Income Responses to Tax 
Changes: A Dynamic Panel Data Approach, October 2007 
 
2122 Doina Maria Radulescu, From Separate Accounting to Formula Apportionment: 
Analysis in a Dynamic Framework, October 2007 
 
2123 Jelle Brouwer, Richard Paap and Jean-Marie Viaene, The Trade and FDI Effects of 
EMU Enlargement, October 2007  
2124 Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume, Competition and Waiting Times 
in Hospital Markets, October 2007 
 
2125 Alexis Direr, Flexible Life Annuities, October 2007 
 
2126 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Quality versus Quantity – The Composition Effect 
of Corporate Taxation on Foreign Direct Investment, October 2007 
 
2127 Balázs Égert, Real Convergence, Price Level Convergence and Inflation Differentials in 
Europe, October 2007 
 
2128 Marko Koethenbuerger, Revisiting the “Decentralization Theorem” – On the Role of 
Externalities, October 2007 
 
2129 Axel Dreher, Silvia Marchesi and James Raymond Vreeland, The Politics of IMF 
Forecasts, October 2007 
 
2130 Andreas Knabe and Ronnie Schöb, Subsidizing Extra Jobs: Promoting Employment by 
Taming the Unions, October 2007 
 
2131 Michel Beine and Bertrand Candelon, Liberalization and Stock Market Co-Movement 
between Emerging Economies, October 2007 
 
2132 Dieter M. Urban, FDI Technology Spillovers and Wages, October 2007 
 
2133 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, Optimal 
Energy Investment and R&D Strategies to Stabilise Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric 
Concentrations, October 2007 
 
2134 David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, The Importance of Being Vigilant: Has ECB 
Communication Influenced Euro Area Inflation Expectations?, October 2007 
 
2135 Oliver Falck, Heavyweights – The Impact of Large Businesses on Productivity Growth, 
October 2007 
 
2136 Xavier Freixas and Bruno M. Parigi, Banking Regulation and Prompt Corrective 
Action, November 2007 
 
2137 Jan K. Brueckner, Partial Fiscal Decentralization, November 2007 
 
2138 Silvia Console Battilana, Uncovered Power: External Agenda Setting, Sophisticated 
Voting, and Transnational Lobbying, November 2007 
 
2139 Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux and Helen Simpson, Taxing Corporate Income, 
November 2007 
 
2140 Lorenzo Cappellari, Paolo Ghinetti and Gilberto Turati, On Time and Money 
Donations, November 2007 
 
  
2141 Roel Beetsma and Heikki Oksanen, Pension Systems, Ageing and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, November 2007 
 
2142 Hikaru Ogawa and David E. Wildasin, Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, 
Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking, November 2007 
 
2143 Alessandro Cigno, A Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Legislation on Marriage, 
Fertility, Domestic Division of Labour, and the Education of Children, November 2007 
 
2144 Kai A. Konrad, Mobile Tax Base as a Global Common, November 2007 
 
2145 Ola Kvaløy and Trond E. Olsen, The Rise of Individual Performance Pay, November 
2007 
 
2146 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Yannis Georgellis, Nicholas Tsitsianis and Ya Ping Yin, 
Income and Happiness across Europe: Do Reference Values Matter?, November 2007 
 
2147 Dan Anderberg, Tax Credits, Income Support and Partnership Decisions, November 
2007 
 
2148 Andreas Irmen and Rainer Klump, Factor Substitution, Income Distribution, and 
Growth in a Generalized Neoclassical Model, November 2007 
 
2149 Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Direct 
Democracy – A First Global Assessment, November 2007 
 
2150 Axel Dreher, Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Friedrich Schneider, The Devil is in the 
Shadow – Do Institutions Affect Income and Productivity or only Official Income and 
Official Productivity?, November 2007 
 
2151 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, International 
Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric 
Stabilization, November 2007 
 
2152 Balázs Égert and Dubravko Mihaljek, Determinants of House Prices in Central and 
Eastern Europe, November 2007 
 
2153 Christa Hainz and Hendrik Hakenes, The Politician and his Banker, November 2007 
 
2154 Josef Falkinger, Distribution and Use of Knowledge under the “Laws of the Web”, 
December 2007 
 
2155 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Eduard Hochreiter, Growing Apart? A Tale of Two 
Republics: Estonia and Georgia, December 2007 
 
2156 Morris A. Davis and François Ortalo-Magné, Household Expenditures, Wages, Rents, 
December 2007 